The "average" firm in the market of United Kingdom has changed its leverage ratio dramatically in the last three decades, following some patterns which apparently cannot be explained by applying simplistic methods. In this paper we try to shed some light in the main stream of the Capital Structure Theories and its critical determinants that influence the evolution in the period of our study. Using the equity decisions of an initial dataset of 3489 firms in UK, we try to reply in three main issues. First, using descriptive statistics, we try to consider how corporate capital structures have evolved during the last three decades in UK. Then, we investigate if existing empirical models explain the changes in the issuing of debt and equity. And last, if these models cannot explain the changes, we examine the nature of forces that are behind variation in financial policy. In our analysis, with a view to find the determinant forces behind, we examine a wide set of linear regressions, concluding to a model comprising of the most prominent factors that affect capital structure changes. Our regression framework is an improvement that can implement the foundation for much future work.
Introduction
The way that firms make their capital structure decisions has been one of the most largely researched areas in corporate finance. Siriopoulos et. al. (2006) claim that, in their attempt to maximize value, firms need to choose the right form of financing for their investment plans. In this respect, a basic choice they make relates to the division of their financing needs between debt and equity, i.e. to their capital structure. Since the powerful work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) on the irrelevance of capital structure in investment decision, a broad literature has emerged, which sculptures firms" capital structure choices under different hypothesis. For instance, theories such as trade off rely on traditional factors as tax incentives and bankruptcy costs of debt.
Meanwhile, pecking order model, as framed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) , applies the asymmetric information or game theoretical framework in which debt or equity is used as a signaling mechanism or strategy tool. In the market-timing model, managers use financing decisions to take advantage of the slow correction of pricing errors and follow a specific order of acts when they want to issue debt (Fama & French 2012) . Many of these theories have also been empirically tested. However, there is little evidence on how firms choose their capital structure and much remains so as to understand the link between theory and practice of capital structure.
In our point of view, the real question is which economic forces are most important to capital structure decision. This paper examines the evolution and determination of corporate financial policy by analyzing a particular, panel data set comprising of accounting and financial market information for UK publicly traded firms over the last three decades. We try to investigate three In our analysis we focus on the considerably specific and possibly the most common variable of capital structure, which obviously is Leverage. Corporate Leverage is defined as the sensitivity of the value of equity ownership with respect to changes in the underlying value of the firm. In an empirical view, leverage ratios are frequently independent variables. Most importantly, Leverage ratios are also the dependent variable in the empirical capital structure literature (Welch 2011) .
Along with them, corporate leverage will be our independent variable in the set of regressions we examine.
In the theory of capital structure, one common hypothesis derives from the equity-sensitivity channel: a firm with more leverage has both higher powered incentives and (usually) a higher probability of financial distress. As a matter of fact, leverage can influence managerial behavior.
A second common hypothesis about leverage stems from the fact that payments to creditors are excluded from corporate income tax (Welch 2011) . These two hypotheses have formed the basic workforce capital structure model since they were applied by Robicheck and Myers (1966) .
The existing literature, has taken advantage of several deep insights into capital structure choice, starting with the most significant and popular "Capital Structure irrelevance proposition" of Modigliani and Miller (1958) . In this regard, the pecking order was not designed as a general theory to explain capital structure for all firms in all settings. More generally, a given market friction may be a first-order concern for some types of firms, but of little relevance to others.
Given the plethora of forces and issues that capital structure research can investigate, challenges going forward including how to discern which issues are first-order important versus secondary, and whether to study relations that hold relatively weakly in broad panels of data versus holding strongly in very narrow samples.
We begin by showing that the evolution of the leverage ratio of the regulated firms 1 is completely different from the whole sample of firms. More specifically, this ratio shows greater volatility and does not follow the "pattern" of the average firm. As a consequence, we exclude them from the final data set, in which we will focus on. Moreover, financial firms are also excluded from the analysis with their special characteristics.
Generally, we found that the average firm of our sample is reaching a peak of 39.41% in 1992 from the low 19.41% of 1980 while thereafter is moderated, clearly influenced by the economic crisis, reaching almost a 24% in 2012 which is the last year of our analysis.
Under some specific assumptions, extensively studied and analyzed, we conclude in the best metric of leverage, which as we will see is the classic corporate leverage. This metric is used in all our statistics and regressions, but we also take into consideration the book and market leverage.
Interestingly, we also found that corporate leverage is significantly and positively influenced by the firm size. To put it differently, each quartile of companies, categorized by their size, has a different statistic mean during the period of our study. For instance, small firms possess an average of 23% and big firms have an additional 7% leverage ratio (30%), which is quite important, considering the huge number of companies examined in our research.
One of the most robust relations that we concluded is the negative relation between corporate leverage and government leverage. The ratio of government debt by Gross Domestic Product possesses the second coefficient in size, after the research and development expenditures, which comes first. Furthermore, the financial intermediation ranks in the third position in terms of statistic coefficient and it is positively correlated with our independent variable.
The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, in section 2 we briefly discuss the theoretical background, citing the most prominent research themes of the literature, concerning our subject. Then, in Section 3 we begin with the first step of our analysis, which is the initial descriptive statistics and specifically the analysis of the leverage across industries. In section 4 we put forth our procedure of the final sample formation and respectively the variable measurement.
In section 5, we proceed with the set of our descriptive statistics and more specifically the time series analysis of a wide set of variables for the firms, which give us the general view of the sample. Then in section 6 we fully present our results of our regression analysis. Subsequently, in section 7 we present the possible areas for further research according to our estimations and, finally, in the last section we describe our conclusion, based on our research.
Theoretical Background and Literature Review
A fundamental problem in corporate finance theory is the way that management determines the firm"s capital structure, namely the optimal combination of debt and equity. Empirical evidence suggests that a firm"s size, profitability, asset utilization, liquidity, and growth prospects have an important effect on the capital structure decision. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that leverage or debt structure (debt to assets) varies across industries, indicating that specific industry factors are at work (Fabozzi 2014) .
Following the Modigliani and Miller (1958) , the vast majority of the literature has concentrated on examining the implications of two traditional streams of capital structure, the static tradeoff model and the pecking order model of Myers and Majluf (1984) (Graham and Leary 2011) .
Empirical evidence has shown that these theories have experienced both successes and challenges. We would add in these two main streams the market conditions model or market timing model, according to which, firms with high prices in relation to fundamental like book value tend to issue more new shares (Fama & French 2012 ).
Before we start analyzing the evolution of capital structure theories, it is essential that we outline the most insightful research of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958 . The researchers prove that in complete and perfect capital markets, the total firm value is independent of its capital structure. Therefore, the value of the firm should be independent of the propositions of debt and equity in firm"s capital structure. In this regard, the idea of optimal capital structure does not exist under the assumption of perfect capital markets.
It is crucial that we understand the essential assumption of perfect capital markets. Thus, Modigliani and Miller (1958) assume perfect capital markets, in which briefly there are no taxes, no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, the same borrowing costs for both companies and investors, no asymmetric information for investors and companies and last no effect of debt on a company"s earnings before interest and taxes. The above mentioned assumptions are of fundamental importance, because can they can give us a realistic view of the factors that influence the capital structure of firms and thus their leverage ratios.
On the other hand, taxes as well as other market imperfections are critical to building or proving a positive theory of capital structure. Thereupon, Miller and Modigliani (1963) and Miller (1977) addressed the issue more thoroughly, proving that under some conditions, the optimal capital structure can be absolute debt finance due to the advantageous treatment of debt in relation to equity in a tax code. Thus, substituting debt for equity generates a surplus by reducing firm tax payments to the government. Firms can then pass this surplus on to investors in the form of higher returns. Miller (1977) resolved the problem of substituting debt for equity, by showing that a firm could generate higher after-tax income to investors, by increasing the debt-equity ratio. This additional income would generate a higher payout to stockholders and bondholders, but the value of the firm would not need to increase. As a result, debt is substituted for equity, the proportion of firm payouts in the form of interest on debt increases relative to payouts for dividends and capital gains on equity. Higher taxes on interest payments than on equity returns reduce or eliminate the advantage of debt finance to the firm. In Miller's (1977) model, "investors face differing personal tax rates and tax arbitrage restrictions. Low tax bracket investors are willing to hold debt at the same risk-adjusted yield as equity. Debt investors that face higher personal tax rates on interest income demand higher yields to compensate for the tax disadvantage of holding debt, leading to an upward-sloping demand schedule" (Graham et al. 2014) . Furthermore, other studies inspected the effect of bankruptcy costs (Stiglitz, 1972) , as well as of agency costs 2 , i.e. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
We continue the analysis of the existing literature by posing a general observation: It is undeniable that many theories of capital structure have been developed and they focused on a cross-sectional microeconomic perspective. However, Taggart (1985) claims that aggregate leverage is determined by the interaction of supply of securities by firms and demand for those securities by investors. This fact is amply demonstrated by the generalization of Miller (1977) , shown in panel 1. On the horizontal axis is the aggregate quantity of corporate debt and on the vertical axis is risk adjusted return of debt (rd) and equity (re). Equally, the demand curve represents investors' willingness to hold corporate debt at different yields. The supply curve represents the willingness of firms to supply debt at different yields.
Panel 1: Supply and Demand for corporate debt
One of the most prominent models in capital structure is the Trade-off model (Myers 1977) . The central idea is that firms have leverage targets and in turn leverage tends to return to its target. In other words, the prediction is that higher leverage relative to target should, on average, lead firms to substitute away from debt toward equity for outside financing (Fama and French 2012) . As a consequence of the tradeoff model, two frictions, the agency costs of financial distress and the tax-deductibility of debt finance, generate an optimal capital structure. This model has many opponents and it has been criticized as "Static". The main theme in this bank of the literature is that the indebtedness wished (or optimal) and real cannot be equal at any time. Market frictions such as transaction costs and financial market imperfections can restrict instantaneous adjustment of the real debts at the desired level. As a result, there is a large literature on dynamic adjustment of capital structure. Miller (1977) continues his significant contribution in the capital structure theory with the "neutral mutation" hypothesis. According to him, firms follow some financing habits or patterns which have no considerable impact on firm value. These habits may make managers feel better and since they do not harm, no one cares to stop or change them. Therefore someone who identifies these habits and uses them to predict financing behavior would not be explaining anything important. With regards to Miller"s hypothesis, Myers (1984) claims that "the neutral mutations idea is important as a warning" and also underlines that by taking neutral mutation as a exacting hypothesis, the research game is becomes too tough to play.
The next model, possessing an outstanding position in capital structure literature, is definitely the Pecking order model of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) . According to the researchers, a financing hierarchy is followed so as to minimize adverse selection costs of security issuance. The pecking order is centrally based on the theory of asymmetric information problems. In this regard, since they are more serious for riskier securities, firms favor to finance with retained earnings; also outside financing is mainly debt rather than new shares. What is more, when they issue debt, they prefer short-term over long-term debt. According to Fama and French (2012) high Price to Book (P/B) growth firms prefer share issues (to take advantage of stock prices that are too high) over new debt or retained earnings. For low P/B value firms, everything reverses. Myers (1984) supports that he was used to ignore the pecking order model, due to the absence of a theoretical background behind this theory. Indeed, the pecking order hypothesis can be quickly dismissed if we want it to illustrate everything. However, no one would dispute the fact that it provides a general idea of a managerial logic behind equity issuance decisions.
We continue the literature review analysis with the Market Conditions model, which has not created so much a confrontation in the academic research. This model possesses different variables. The model predicts that firms with high prices relative to a fundamental like book value tend to issue more new shares. The market-timing version of the model is an off-shot of the behavioral story for the value premium in average stock returns (Fama and French 2012) .
Before closing the literature review section it is worth mentioning a different and more practical perspective concerning the Financing choices across the life cycle of a firm. Damodaran claims that the external financing decisions developed during a company"s life cycle, start by Owner"s equity and bank debt, then they introduce Venture capital and common stock, afterwards common stock, warrants and convertibles, subsequently debt and finally retire debt and repurchase stock 
Leverage evolution within industries
According to the bibliography, significant variations in Leverage ratios across several sectors are documented. It is possible that, the earliest cross-sectional observations about capital structure originate from industry studies, of Schwartz and Aronson (1967) . For instance, regulated utilities and real estate firms tend to use considerable amounts of debt financing while firms in more technology-oriented industries incline to use very limited amount of debt. Furthermore, it has been claimed that capital structure is significantly differed even across the same sector. On this regard, Parsons and Titman (2008) present the example of the debt to-equity ratio of ConocoPhillips (.25), which was over three times larger than that of ExxonMobil (.08), despite the fact that they are very similar integrated oil companies. 45% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 All Industries 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 In our analysis we calculate the aggregate measures of the variables used in regressions, because they seem to be more compatible with our analysis" macroeconomic perspective, giving us obviously improved results both in statistically terms and in economic ones. We analytically present the full set of our variables, how they calculated and all the sources of our research in Appendix A.
Descriptive Statistics of the firms Firm Size Leverage types and Statistics
The empirical literature establishes a number of proxies that represent firm characteristics, which are likely to be correlated with the costs and benefits of debt financing. For instance, firm size plays a prominent role in capital structure with larger firms with more diversified assets exhibit higher leverage ratios, taking advantage of its capability to avoid or smooth financial distress costs. In the same way, the tangibility of a firm"s assets likely affects its losses in the event of financial distress, and thus its target capital structure. Finally, in a research of European countries, Siriopoulos et. al. (2011) maintain that firm size, growth opportunities and earnings persistence have a positive and significant effect on stock prices, while leverage seem to have a negative impact only during the pre-euro adoption period. Before exploring these issues in more detail, it is worthwhile to describe and highlight the firm characteristics of our sample.
From a different perspective, taking as a base the firm size we investigate the Leverage evolution in each firm quartile. More specifically, we take as "Small Firms" all the firms above the 25 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Small Firms Medium Large Firms 0% 35% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Small In panel 27, we view the evolution of Market to Book ratio, which reaches its minimum prices in 2008 and 2002. Its prices clearly depict the countrys" economic climate and from the whole period of our study the maximum price is reached in the years 1997 and 1999. The significance of Market to Book ratio has been broadly underlined by the mainstrem of the academic research.
Alto A. (2006) claims that in addition to growth prospects, the market-to-book ratio is affected by several factors, such as the current state of the economy or the capital tendency of the firm"s technology. As a result, two firms equal market-to-book ratios may differ importantly in their growth potential. The next diagram about (Debt-cash)/ Total Assets (panel 28) is difficult to be explained from a first view. As a generic comment, we can say that this mumber is roughly decreasing from 13.45% in 1992 to 1.53% up to the end of our research. 
Results Analysis
After examining a wide set of linear regressions we conclude in our basic model which contains the parameters shown on Appendix E (Table 1) . Our results are really encouraging and specifically we reach the impressive r²=97.99%. Their overall explanations possess strong economic backup and in this section we comprehensively analyze them, examining the impact of each factor separately.
Tax Exposure
The tax deductibility of interest payments is the most obvious benefit of leverage. Since of these tax benefits, we would expect that companies, with higher taxable income to obtain a higher level of debt in their capital structures 7 . In line with this view, Givoly et al. (1992) found that debt incline to be less popular after the reduction in tax rates, with highly taxed firms decreasing debt the most. However Titman S. and Parsons C. (2009) show paradigms of early studies which found that tax rates and leverage have surprisingly weak evidence for tax variables playing significant roles in leverage choices. We start our regressions, taking into account the factor of tax rate but in fact we did not find some statistically significant relationship and thus we finally exclude it from our model. 7 For a deeper examination of taxes and leverage, see Graham (2006 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 (Debt-Cash)/Total Assets
Cash Flow volatility
From a first qualitative view, one could say that there should be some relation volatility of a firm"s cash flows and its degree of leverage. According to Titman S. & Parsons C. (2009) , "most of the existing empirical work assumes that the relation between volatility and the optimal debt ratio is monotonic". However we did not manage to prove some evidence of relationship and as a result we did not take it into consideration in our final model.
Size
It is undeniable that the factor of firm size has been found by many studies to be positively related to Leverage. In this regard, Rajan & Zingales (1995) detected a strong relationship between them, providing evidence from a number of countries. This evidence is significantly weaker in Titman & Wessels (1988) research. On the other hand, there are some studies, in which such a relationship was not proved (Kim & Sorensen (1986) and Mehran (1992) . In this regard, Siriopoulos et. al. (2011) support that big-sized firms tend to be less leveraged as well as they yield greater stock returns but only during the pre-euro adoption period. Also, they have lower earnings persistence compared to their small-sized counterparts.
In our model, we found in the same line with the dominant literature that firm size is also an important factor. Specifically, it is the most statistically important factor with t=210.19 and coefficient 0,014853. This fact is very important considering that when we have a bigger firm, this firm will have bigger leverage. Consequently, the bigger the firm is the bigger the leverage is.
This result is also absolutely rational, taking into account that a sizable company has easier access to the financial markets, can issue stocks or preferred stocks, taking advantage of the economies of scale in comparison with a small company which cannot have the same ease in borrowing money.
Asset Tangibility/ Liquidity
The tangibility of assets is also an important factor. We found that it is positively correlated with the corporate leverage. Therefore, asset tangibility is a powerful sign of an increased corporate leverage ratio. Remarkably, the aggregate tangibility encompasses both economical and statistical meaning with the coefficient equals to 0.514109 and t statistic 203.61. This is so normal, considering that the banks are used to borrow money easily when the firms have Fixed Assets. On the other hand, it seems that the more intangible assets a company has, the least leverage it uses.
Our findings about this factor are fully consistent with the broader literature. More specifically, Titman & Wessels (1988) and also Friend & Lang (1988) found a positive relationship between tangibility and corporate leverage.
Market to Book Ratio
According to Titman S. & Parsons C. (2009) , there is a negative relationship between the leverage with the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity (M/B). Therefore, this factor can be a solid predictor of leverage. The relation has been extensively documented, e.g., by
Hovakimian (2004), and Frank and Goyal (2004) . However the strong economic meaning of this ratio and the strong initial positive relationship we document in table 3 (Appendix D), we did not find some statistically significant relationship and thus we did not take it into our final model.
Industry Effects
As we have earlier discussed, there are clearest signs that each industry has its own characteristics, so it strongly affects the factor of leverage. Although, Titman S. & Parsons C.
(2009) suggest that although industry affiliations are likely to contain information about target debt ratios, they do not capture everything. Our final analysis was general and we only excluded the Utilities firms.
Profitability
Despite of the method of its calculation, profitability is negatively correlated with leverage ratios.
This fact is amply demonstrated by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) and has also been documented in numerous subsequent studies. Several specifications for profitability have been widely investigated by the literature. We, in accordance with the vast majority of the literature, found profitability as an important determinant with t statistic = -82.77
and a coefficient = -0.1617. In other words, this negative correlation proves the fact that the more profitable is a firm the less leveraged it is, respectively. We see that this could be the truth; when company has high profitability, implies that it will have enough cash holdings and thus it will not need more money to borrow.
Market Return
There are many paradigms shown that market or stock return is positively correlated with the leverage. For instance, Welch (2004) records a very strong negative relation between past stock returns and debt ratios. In our dataset, the Market Return is positively correlated with the Corporate Leverage with t=10.13 and coefficient 2.24. In our data, as a proxy for the Market return we use the return of the FTSE ALL SHARES of the London stock exchange index.
Therefore, a positive movement of the market improves companies" ability to increase their debt and their Leverage Ratio. This fact seems quite normal as the positive climate of the market creates a good climate to the companies to start their investment plans and to borrow money so as to start new projects.
Government Debt
Importantly, the government debt is statistically important with t=55.07 and is negatively correlated with the corporate leverage with coefficient equal to -16.58. This means that as far as the Government Debt increases, the corporate leverage is on the decrease and vice versa. To put it differently, when the government decreases debt issuance, corporations increase their use of debt in relation to equity, concluding in a subsequent increase in corporate leverage. This conclusion is very important and in line with the current literature. As a matter of a fact, we strengthen the existing literature by proving it. At the same line, Graham et al. (2014) states that the Government Debt is a "substitute" of corporate leverage and subsequently debt. He found that a one standard deviation increase in government leverage is connected with a one-quarter standard deviation decrease in aggregate corporate debt-to-capital.
GDP Growth
A negative relation between Gross Domestic Product and corporate leverage is apparent. GDP Growth has the biggest coefficient, equal to -72.26 and t=-49.85 (see Appendix E). Therefore, as long as the economy is growing the Corporate Leverage is decreasing. It can be assumed that when we have growth companies do not borrow money from banks. In this point of view it may seems strange, but if we think it in a period of recession, it may be more normal as the growth ratio is negative and thus the Corporate Leverage is increasing, meaning that the companies have increased needs to borrow extra money.
Financial Intermediation
Consistent with previous research, the Financial Intermediation is undisputedly significant with t=34.32 and positively correlated with the Corporate Leverage. Graham et. al. (2014) proved the fact that more output from the financial sector is associated with more issuance of both debt and equity. This seems absolutely true and quite expected from a research like this. It is very normal as when the financial/banking sector is expanded the direct consequence is expected to be the fact that the banks tend to lend more money to companies, and companies are easier to get money so as to put in place their growing and investment plans. For this particular metric we take the index of Financial Sector Intermediation as the most appropriate as we can also see from the diagram in figure 19 in Appendix C. From the same diagram, we observe the fact that financial intermediation, independent of the specific proxy we use for it, is continuously increasing during the period of our study and specifically from the poor 33% of co166 Domestic credit held by the financial sector to the undoubtedly exiting 216% in 2008 and 166% in 2012.
Spread between BAA and AAA Moody's yield
The credit spread between BAA and AAA bonds is encompassed to acquire the general level of interest rates in the economy and credit conditions. One more rational result is the fact that the spread between BAA and AAA yield is also negatively correlated with the Corporate Leverage.
Specifically, this variable"s coefficient is calculated 0,153165 and accordingly the t= -2.81. This matter is fully in accordance with our logic and also proves that if the spread is increases then the Leverage is decreasing. It is so typical, considering that when the interests are on the increase, a negative climate for the companies is flourished to lend money.
Other Factors not showing statistical importance
Remarkably, the factors of aggregate goodwill, Operating Liabilities, net Income and R&D Expenditures, comprising a firm specific group of variables, are also statistically important, obtaining high values of t statistic. On the contrary their coefficients are extremely small, meaning that they do not have big influence in economic terms. Finally, using the aggregate cash & Short term investments to assets ratio we find a positive relationship. So long as the cash & Short Term Investment goes upwards, the corporate Leverage goes also up. In other words companies with greater amount of cash, are more capable of borrowing money so as to invest, and this is true. When a company has strong financial position, it can guarantee that the investors will take their money back.
Areas for further research
In the final analysis, we started analyzing our panel data with regards to Quantile Regression. We proved that pseudo r squared is fluctuating across deciles. In this regard, we obtained some initial evidence that we have different coefficients of each factor in each decile. This gives us a sign that corporate leverage can be different from decile to decile, meaning that the level of the leverage itself plays a significant role in its determination from the other parameters. To put it differently, when we focus on the outliers, we observe that different factors determine the capital structure decision of each company. When the company has an expanded ratio of corporate Leverage, it is influenced by different parameters than a firm with low leverage. It is highly recommended that someone has to investigate the influence of leverage quantile in the quantile itself.
Moreover, we conclude that macro factors play an important role in the final analysis in the leverage of firms and for this reason more work should be done in this direction. The significance of government borrowing should be studied deeper in country level, in conjunction with the total private debt of each country and how this is connected to the end with the macro factors of a country"s economy. It can be shown that the level of a country"s firm"s debt can have significant influence or a negative relationship with its government debt.
Future research examining the implications mentioned above can be fruitful. It could give us more precise and deeper meanings in the effort of broadly improving the general knowledge of capital structure theory and its applications in Corporate Finance.
Conclusion
In our analysis, we examined thoroughly from many and different perspectives the evolution of corporate capital structure in UK firms during the past three decades. We documented a diversion between regulated and unregulated firms. The former show significant volatility and cannot be explained in real terms. We focus our attention and try to explain the changes in the leverage ratios of the latter and interestingly they fluctuate, being influenced by plenty of factors. As a general remark, it can be said that firm specific characteristics are not capable of explaining the changes in corporate financial policy in UK unregulated firms. Consequently, we additionally investigate a wide set of macroeconomic factors which display plausible results in aggregate level with the impressive r square, reaching the 97.99%.
Firms appear to increase their tendency to use debt in the first period and up to 1991, but after this period there seems to be some moderation, which becomes more intense in the last period from the outburst of the global economic crisis. The firm"s size seems to have a prominent role, being positively correlated with the corporate leverage, which proved to be realistic. From our analysis, we also found that the profitability of a firm is positively correlated. The more profitable one firm is the more propensities possess to increase its debt and thus its leverage ratio.
In our regressions, we also took into account market data and as a result, it was proved that a the positive movement of the market, counted with the return of the FTSE ALL SHARES of the London stock exchange "helps" the companies to increase their debt and their Leverage Ratio.
Noteably, and as one of the most important and helpful results for further research, we demonstrated that as far as the Government Debt increases, the corporate leverage is on the decrease and vice versa. This result can have many applications and especially in our age and time with a lot of problems in government debt of the countries, can give a connection link between the public and private debts of a country, showing that these two factors should be examined together.
Consistent with previous research, the Financial Intermediation is undisputedly significant with t=34.32 and positively correlated with the Corporate Leverage, meaning that the financial sector itself plays an essential role in expanding firms" debt capacities. In the same direction, the spread between BAA and AAA yield is also negatively correlated with the Corporate Leverage, which seems also rational.
All of our results are plausible enough and can help in many direction of the future research. We are very positive that we put a little more light in the mainstream of the research on capital structure.
However the abundance of the academic work which has notwithstanding been done in the area of capital structure, our contribution in this work hopes to provide mainly for the enhancement of the basic findings of the theory with sound economical meanings. In the final analysis, as also Anuja R. Singha (2000) states, it seems that "Capital Structure remains enigmatic" and more job needed for a better understanding of the mechanisms behind capital structure theory. 
Firm size = Natural log of total sales
Relative firm size = natural log of the ratio of total sales
Earnings volatility = standard deviation of the ratio of EBIT / Total book value of assets, calculated over the trailing ten years. We require at least four years of trailing EBIT data to calculate the standard deviation. For firms with at least four, but less than ten years of available data, it is calculated over all available trailing years. 
Intangible assets

